

# 2018 Political Economy of Development Political Science | Columbia University

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Location: Lindsay Rogers Room

Please note the unusual meeting times:

- Sep. 4, 6 @ 6:10-8 pm
- Oct. 22, 23, 24, 25 29 30 @ 6:10-8 pm
- Oct. 26 @ 2:10-4 (Friday afternoon)
- Dec. 3, 4, 5, 6 @ 6:10-8 pm
- Dec. 7 @ 10:10 am - 12 pm

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# 1 Expectations

## 1.1 Overview

This is an advanced class that engages with contemporary research on the political economy of development. It assumes comfort engaging with statistical and formal models. The major questions to be addressed by the course are: How central is politics to economic development? How do political institutions determine policy choices? How do economic structures in turn impact on politics? Why do governments employ policies that hinder development? Why do seemingly inefficient institutions survive? What accounts for political accountability? How important are international effects relative to domestic features? We do not aim to cover all the classics but will rather engage in detail with the evidentiary and theoretical bases for major claims in this literature. We will focus explicitly on extracting underlying (implied) causal models from papers we read and will attempt to characterize research strategies using design “declaration.” Alongside prominent research the syllabus includes papers by recent ABDs as models of excellent research within reach.

## 1.2 Requirements

To do now: Fill up this form today; you will not be admitted if you do not complete this form by midnight of the first day of class, Sept 4: <https://tinyurl.com/ped-survey-2018>

1. Reading and participating (20%): The syllabus lists both required reading (numbered) and further reading (bulleted). You will be expected to have completed all the required readings before class to the point where you can be called on to critique or defend any reading. Some notes on how to read: <http://www.macartan.nyc/teaching/how-to-read/> and how to critique <http://www.macartan.nyc/teaching/discuss/>
2. Group replication and presentations (30%). You will be expected to participate in all seminars—concentrated over three weeks. In general you should come prepared to argue and defend your responses to the readings. In addition we will organize the group into a set of 5 - 7 “replication teams”—RTs. One RT is assigned to one session in each of Parts 2 and 3 of the course and is charged with identifying a dataset associated with the readings (or from elsewhere) and to engage in a replication and extension exercise.

These exercises involve “declaring” a design, replicating the results as reported, checking results for robustness via design modifications, and extending analysis where appropriate, for example to examine subsets of the data, extended models and so on. The RTs are responsible for sending the class, by the night before, a zip file containing an Rmd file that can run analysis without further editing. The RTs will be expected to give a short presentation in class (15 minutes) and to be able to engage in real time analysis in response to class discussion. Each student should expect to engage in two such RT presentations. Doing this well means preparing early; if authors have not made their data available you will have to contact them for their data which can take time; moreover while most analyses will be fairly simple, it can sometimes take a while to get to know a dataset to the point that you can run such analyses confidently. Data-free replications (design replications) are also permitted when data is unavailable.

3. Final project (50%). Your final paper will consist of a design replication of one of the papers from the optional reading list or from off the syllabus. The replication will be accompanied by a 5 - 6 page discussion of the underlying **Model** and the reliability of the data and answer strategies used. They may also include a short proposed alternative design declaration which may include original theoretical or empirical work.

## 2 Topics

### 2.1 Frameworks: 4 Sept

1. Daron Acemoglu. *Introduction to modern economic growth*. Princeton University Press, 2008. URL <http://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8764.pdf> Ch 1. In addition useful to survey Ch 2 and Ch 22 parts 22.1 to 22.6 (not online) alongside lecture notes.
2. The Varieties of Democracy Project. Democracy for all? Technical report, VDEM, 2018. URL [https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer\\_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem\\_democracy\\_report\\_2018.pdf](https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0ec894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf) Parts 1 and 2

We will also:

1. discuss DAGs with an application to . If you are not familiar with DAGs already, please read: Felix Elwert. Graphical causal models. In *Handbook of causal analysis for social research*, pages 245–273. Springer, 2013. URL <https://www.ssc.wisc.edu/soc/faculty/pages/docs/elwert/Elwert%202013.pdf>.
2. discuss formal design declaration and diagnosis and the MIDA framework. See G Blair, J Cooper, A Coppock, and M Humphreys. Declaring and diagnosing research designs. 2006. *Working Paper*, 2018. URL <https://declaredesign.org/paper.pdf>

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- Abhijit V Banerjee and Esther Duflo. The economic lives of the poor. *Journal of economic perspectives*, 21(1):141–168, 2007. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.21.1.141>

### 2.2 Application of frameworks to research on Institutional Legacies: 6 Sept

Exercise: take each reading and (a) develop a DAG representing a core part of the argument and (b) describe the research in the MIDA framework. Bonus for formal declaration but not expected.

1. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, 2001. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677930>
2. Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer. History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. *The American Economic Review*, 95(4):1190–1213, 2005. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132711>
3. Nathan Nunn. The long-term effects of Africa’s slave trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1):139–176, 2008. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098896>

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- Elise Huillery. History matters: The long-term impact of colonial public investments in French West Africa. *American economic journal: applied economics*, 1(2):176–215, 2009. URL <https://hal-sciencespo.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01052798/document>
  - Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. Reversal of fortune: Geography and institutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 117(4):1231–1294, 2002. URL <https://economics.mit.edu/files/4127>

- Douglass C North. *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge University Press, 1990 Chapter 1 ■■
- Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast. Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(04):803–832, 1989. ISSN 1471-6372. doi: doi:10.1017/S0022050700009451. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2122739>

### 2.3 The State, Institutions, & State Strength 22 Oct

1. Mancur Olson. Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development. *American Political Science Review*, 87(3):567–576, 1993. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938736>
2. Jeffrey Herbst. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton University Press, 2000. ISBN 0691010285 Chapters 1-3 ■■
3. Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. Democracy, war, and wealth: lessons from two centuries of inheritance taxation. *American Political Science Review*, 106(01):81–102, 2012. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000517>
4. Raúl Sánchez De La Sierra. On the origin of the state: Stationary bandits and taxation in eastern congo. *Journal of Political Economy*, forthcoming. URL <https://raulsanchezdelasierra.files.wordpress.com/2018/08/paper3.pdf>

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- Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic development. *Journal of economic growth*, 9(2):131–165, 2004
  - Charles Tilly. *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992 (Studies in Social Discontinuity)*. Wiley-Blackwell, revised edition, 1992. ISBN 1557863687 Chapters 1-3 ■■
  - Kenneth A. Shepsle. *Rational Choice Institutionalism*. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008. ISBN 9780199548460. doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0002. URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199548460.003.0002>.
  - James C Scott. *Seeing like a state: How certain schemes to improve the human condition have failed*. Yale University Press, 1998 1-83. ■■

### 2.4 Inequality and Democratization 23 Oct

1. Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik. Distributive politics and economic growth. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 109(2):465–490, 1994. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118470>
2. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski. Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. *Comparative political studies*, 40(11):1279–1301, 2007. URL <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0010414007305817>
3. Ben Ansell and David Samuels. Inequality and democratization: A contractarian approach. *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(12):1543–1574, 2010

4. Stephan Haggard and Robert R Kaufman. Inequality and regime change: Democratic transitions and the stability of democratic rule. *American Political Science Review*, 106(03):495–516, 2012. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055412000287>

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- Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi. Modernization: Theories and Facts. *World Politics*, 49(2):155–183, 1997. ISSN 00438871, 10863338. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25053996>
  - Beatriz Magaloni. Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41:715 – 741, 2008. URL <http://m.cps.sagepub.com/content/41/4-5/715.short>
  - Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson. A theory of political transitions. *American Economic Review*, 91(4):938–963, 2001. URL <http://ideas.repec.org/a/aea/aecrev/v91y2001i4p938-963.html>
  - Noam Lupu and Jonas Pontusson. The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 105(02):316–336, 2011. ISSN 0003-0554. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055411000128. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000128>
  - Carles Boix. *Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*. Cambridge University Press, 2003. ISBN 0521532671 Chapter 1 ■■

## 2.5 Rival authorities 24 Oct

1. Jasper Cooper. State Capacity and Gender Inequality: Experimental evidence from Papua New Guinea. *Working Paper*, 2018. URL [http://jasper-cooper.com/papers/Cooper\\_CAP.pdf](http://jasper-cooper.com/papers/Cooper_CAP.pdf)
2. Kate Baldwin. Why vote with the chief? Political connections and public goods provision in Zambia. *American Journal of Political Science*, 57(4):794–809, 2013. URL <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ajps.12023>
3. Daron Acemoglu, Tristan Reed, and James A Robinson. Chiefs: Economic development and elite control of civil society in Sierra Leone. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(2):319–368, 2014. URL <https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/674988>
4. Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. Pre-colonial ethnic institutions and contemporary African development. *Econometrica*, 81(1):113–152, 2013. URL [https://www.jstor.org/stable/23357265?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23357265?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

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- Donal C O’Brien. Saints and politicians: essays in the organisation of a Senegalese peasant society. 1975 ■■

## 2.6 Political Violence 25 Oct

NB: Class in 711

1. Edward Miguel, Shanker Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti. Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict: An Instrumental Variables Approach. *Journal of Political Economy*, 112(4):725–753, 2004. ISSN 0022-3808. doi: 10.1086/421174. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/421174>

2. David Yanagizawa-Drott. Propaganda and conflict: Evidence from the Rwandan genocide. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(4):1947–1994, 2014. URL <https://academic.oup.com/qje/article/129/4/1947/1853091>
3. Summer Lindsey. Conflict, Protection, and Punishment: Repercussions of Violence in eastern DR Congo. *Working Paper*, 2018
4. Paul Collier. On the Economic Consequences of Civil War. *Oxf. Econ. Pap.*, 51(1):168–183, 1999. doi: 10.1093/oep/51.1.168. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3488597>

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- Tamar Mitts. From Isolation to Radicalization: Anti-Muslim Hostility and Support for ISIS in the West. 2017
  - James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
  - Beth Roy. *Some trouble with cows: Making sense of social conflict*. Univ of California Press, 1994 “The Quarrel,” “The Decision,” and “The Riot” ■■
  - Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel. Civil War. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1):3–57, 2010. doi: 10.1257/jel.48.1.3. URL <http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.48.1.3>
  - Stathis Kalyvas. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics)*. Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0521670047 Chapter 1,2 ■■

## 2.7 Property Rights 26 Oct

NB: Class meets at 2:10 on Friday

1. Erica Field. Property rights and investment in urban slums. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2-3):279–290, 2005. URL <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.279>
2. Abhit Bhandari. The Political Determinants of Economic Exchange: Evidence from a Business Experiment in Senegal. *Working Paper*, 2018
3. Kathryn Firmin-Sellers. The politics of property rights. *American political science review*, 89(4):867–881, 1995. URL [https://www.jstor.org/stable/2082514?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2082514?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)
- 4.

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- Sebastian Galiani and Ernesto Schargrotsky. Property rights for the poor: Effects of land titling. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94(9-10):700–729, 2010

## 2.8 Macro Aid Effects 29 Oct

1. Adam Przeworski and James Raymond Vreeland. The effect of IMF programs on economic growth. *Journal of Development Economics*, 62(2):385–421, 2000. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304387800000900>
2. William Easterly and Tobias Pfutze. Where does the money go? Best and worst practices in foreign aid. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2):29–52, 2008. URL <https://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.22.2.29>
3. Craig Burnside and David Dollar. Aid, policies, and growth. *American economic review*, 90(4):847–868, 2000. URL <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/117311.pdf>
4. Stephen Knack. Does foreign aid promote democracy? *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(1):251–266, 2004. URL <https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/48/1/251/1795552>

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- William Easterly, Ross Levine, and David Roodman. Aid, policies, and growth: comment. *American economic review*, 94(3):774–780, 2004. URL <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3592954.pdf>
  - Rajesh Venugopal. Ineptitude, ignorance, or intent: The social construction of failure in development. *World Development*, 106:238–247, 2018. URL <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/venugopr/venugopal%202017%20Social%20Construction%20of%20Failure%20in%20Development-%20single%20space.pdf>

## 2.9 Experimentation, Technological Fixes: 30 Oct

1. Martin Ravallion. Should the Randomistas (Continue to) Rule? Technical report, 2018. URL <https://www.cgdev.org/publication/should-randomistas-continue-rule>
2. Lant Pritchett and Justin Sandefur. Context matters for size: why external validity claims and development practice do not mix. *Journal of Globalization and Development*, 4(2):161–197, 2013
3. Michael Callen, Clark C Gibson, Danielle F Jung, and James D Long. Improving electoral integrity with information and communications technology. *Journal of Experimental Political Science*, 3(1):4–17, 2016
4. Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus, and Sandip Sukhtankar. Building state capacity: Evidence from biometric smartcards in India. *American Economic Review*, 106(10):2895–2929, 2016

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- Angus S Deaton. Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to economic development. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009
  - Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M Weinstein. Field experiments and the political economy of development. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:367–378, 2009. URL [http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HW\\_ARPS09.pdf](http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/HW_ARPS09.pdf)
  - Catie Snow Bailard. A field experiment on the internet’s effect in an African election: savvy citizens, disaffected voters, or both? *Journal of Communication*, 62(2):330–344, 2012

## 2.10 Ethnic politics: 3 Dec

1. Patrick Francois, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. How is power shared in Africa? *Econometrica*, 83(2):465–503, 2015
2. Moses Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):147–174, 2009. doi: 10.1017/s0003055409090194. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27798495>
3. Kristin Michelitch. Does electoral competition exacerbate interethnic or interpartisan economic discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment in market price bargaining. *American Political Science Review*, 109(1):43–61, 2015
4. Evan Lieberman. Ethnic Politics, Risk, and Policy-Making: A Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Government Responses to HIV/AIDS. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(12):1407–1432, 2007. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/40/12/1407.short>

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- James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2945838. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945838>
  - Rogers Brubaker. Ethnicity without groups. *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Europennes de Sociologie*, 43(02):163–189, 2002. ISSN 1474-0583. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003975602001066. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003975602001066>
  - Kanchan Chandra. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780521891417. URL <http://tinyurl.com/kchandra-intro> Introduction
  - Robert H. Bates. Ethnic Competition and Modernization in Contemporary Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 6(4):457–484, 1974. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/6/4/457.full.pdf+html>

## 2.11 Migration and between group contact 4 Dec

1. Gharad Bryan, Shyamal Chowdhury, and Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak. Underinvestment in a profitable technology: The case of seasonal migration in Bangladesh. *Econometrica*, 82(5):1671–1748, 2014
2. Gautam Rao. Familiarity does not breed contempt: Generosity, discrimination and diversity in delhi schools. Technical report, UC Berkeley Mimeo, 2014
3. Alexandra Scacco and Shana S Warren. Can social contact reduce prejudice and discrimination? Evidence from a field experiment in Nigeria. *American Political Science Review*, pages 1–24, 2018
4. Nikhar Gaikwad and Gareth Nellis. Do Politicians Discriminate Against Internal Migrants? Evidence from Nationwide Field Experiments in India. Technical report, IGC working paper, 2016

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- Elizabeth Levy Paluck, Seth A Green, and Donald P Green. The contact hypothesis re-evaluated. *Behavioural Public Policy*, pages 1–30, 2018
  - Matt Lowe. Unity in cricket: Integrated leagues and caste divisions. 2018



## 2.12 Networks: 5 December

1. Zachary C Steinert-Threlkeld. Spontaneous collective action: peripheral mobilization during the Arab spring. *American Political Science Review*, 111(2):379–403, 2017
2. Cesi Cruz, Julien Labonne, and Pablo Querubin. Politician family networks and electoral outcomes: Evidence from the philippines. *American Economic Review*, 107(10):3006–37, 2017
3. Jennifer M Larson and Janet I Lewis. Ethnic networks. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(2):350–364, 2017
4. Daron Acemoglu, Camilo Garcia-Jimeno, and James A Robinson. State capacity and economic development: A network approach. *American Economic Review*, 105(8):2364–2409, 2015. URL <https://economics.mit.edu/files/10667>

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- Raymond Fisman. Estimating the value of political connections. *American economic review*, 91(4):1095–1102, 2001

## 2.13 Accountability & Citizen/Politician Linkages 6 Dec

1. Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117(4):1415–1451, 2002. doi: 10.1162/003355302320935061. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/117/4/1415.abstract>
2. Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745, 2008. doi: 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703. URL <http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/content/123/2/703.abstract>
3. Dunning et al. Metaketa 1. Chs 1-2, 11
4. Guy Grossman and Kristin Michelitch. Information dissemination, competitive pressure, and politician performance between elections: A field experiment in Uganda. *American Political Science Review*, 112(2):280–301, 2018. URL <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/information-dissemination-competitive-pressure-and-politician-performance-between-el/184729F72A0611C6862A66299FF31A76>

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- Guy Grossman, Melina R Platas, and Jonathan Rodden. Crowdsourcing accountability: ICT for service delivery. *World Development*, 112:74–87, 2018
  - Imran Rasul and Daniel Rogger. Management of bureaucrats and public service delivery: Evidence from the nigerian civil service. *The Economic Journal*, 128(608):413–446, 2018
  - Martina Björkman and Jakob Svensson. Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2):735–769, 2009
  - Rohini Pande. Can Mandated Political Representation Increase Policy Influence for Disadvantaged Minorities? Theory and Evidence from India. *The American Economic Review*, 93(4):1132–1151, 2003. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3132282>
  - Adam Przeworski, Susan C Stokes, and Bernard Manin. *Democracy, accountability, and representation*, volume 2. Cambridge University Press, 1999 ■■

## 2.14 Political Inequality 7 Dec

1. Sarah Khan. Personal is Political: Prospects for Womens Substantive Representation in Pakistan. 2017. URL [https://www.dropbox.com/s/1fke9fif511j0hh/20171101JMP\\_SK.pdf?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/1fke9fif511j0hh/20171101JMP_SK.pdf?dl=0)
  2. Lori Beaman, Raghendra Chattopadhyay, Esther Duflo, Rohini Pande, and Petia Topalova. Powerful women: does exposure reduce bias? *The Quarterly journal of economics*, 124(4):1497–1540, 2009. URL <https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1497>
  3. Tara Slough. Bureaucrats Driving Inequality in Access: Experimental Evidence from Colombia. *Working Paper*, 2018. URL [https://www.dropbox.com/s/jpd2akzrmnn6pa3/Paper\\_v3.pdf?dl=0](https://www.dropbox.com/s/jpd2akzrmnn6pa3/Paper_v3.pdf?dl=0)
  4. Rikhil R Bhavnani. Do electoral quotas work after they are withdrawn? Evidence from a natural experiment in India. *American Political Science Review*, 103(1):23–35, 2009. URL <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090029>
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