

# 2015-16 Comparative Comps Exam Handbook

## Political Science | Columbia University

Version 2.0 (of a live document that is liable to change)

September 2015

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Topic ID	Cluster Name	Topic	CP Seminar 1	CP Seminar 2
1.1	Approaches	Causal Inference and Identification [Fall:15]	1	
1.2	Approaches	Natural Experiments [Spring:16]		1
1.3	Approaches	Qualitative Methods, Case Studies and Process-Tracing [Fall:15]	1	
1.4	Approaches	Models of Politics [Fall:15]	1	
2.1	Primitives	Collective Action & Applications [Fall:15]	1	
2.2	Primitives	Bargaining & Applications [Fall:15]	1	
2.3	Primitives	Groups & Coalitions [Fall:15]	1	
2.4	Primitives	Identity Politics [Fall:15]	1	
2.5	Primitives	Political Culture [Fall:15]	1	
2.6	Primitives	Institutions [Fall:15]	1	
3.1	Political Structures	The State, Institutions, & State Strength [Spring:16]		1
3.2	Political Structures	Parties & Democratic Systems [Spring:16]		1
3.3	Political Structures	Voting, Elections and Electoral Systems [Spring:16]		1
3.4	Political Structures	Non-Democratic Systems [Spring:16]		1
4.1	Outcomes I	Political Violence [Fall:15]	1	
4.2	Outcomes I	Non-Electoral Participation [Fall:15]	1	
4.3	Outcomes I	Revolutions and Regime Change [Structures] [Fall:15]	1	
4.4	Outcomes I	Democratization [Fall:15]	1	
5.1	Outcomes II	Electoral Participation [Spring:16]		1
5.2	Outcomes II	Accountability & Citizen/Politician Linkages [Spring:16 – two weeks]		1
5.3	Outcomes II	Corruption [Spring:16]		1
6.1	Outcomes III	Inequality & Polarization [Spring:16]		1
6.2	Outcomes III	Growth [Spring:16]		1
6.3	Outcomes III	Redistribution & the Welfare State [Spring:16]		1
6.4	Outcomes III	Policy Choice & Policy Reform [Spring:16]		1

Table 1: Clusters and Topics

# 1. Readings and Clusters

Students will be expected to have deep knowledge of the arguments and evidence contained in the core reading list. The reading list will generally include between about 125 readings, each of relevance to one or two topics. *In addition to the core reading list students will be expected to be familiar with all Comparative Politics articles published in the APSR in the twelve months prior to the examination in question.*

This list exposes you to a diversity of approaches, theoretical perspectives, and thematic areas. It should not however be considered a “canon” — while most of the readings have been influential this does not mean that they are uniformly compelling; nor does omission from the list suggest readings are unimportant. You are **encouraged to read well beyond this list** as you engage deeply with topics; nevertheless it will be **possible** to pass your comprehensive exams drawing solely on deep understanding of the readings on this list and your ability to reason about research strategies and cases.

All readings are available on line or on courseworks. You are encouraged but not required to buy books marked with a ♠ .

# 2. Readings, classes & exams

The readings have been roughly allocated across two semesters of the Comparative Politics Field Seminar and you can expect that one topic will be covered in each seminar in each week on average, though instructors may split or aggregate topics differently in different years and may select which readings to treat as required readings for class discussion purposes differently in different years.

The reading list is liable to be updated from year to year. Exams will be based on the reading list of the immediately preceding year. So for example exams in May and September 2016 and January 2017 will be based on the 2015-2016 academic year list.

# 3. How to read

The Comps reading list is not especially large. But some readings are hard. You should aim to read carefully and reflectively. Here are guides to critiquing and to reading.

# 4. Exam Structure

The exam contain **nine** questions divided into 6 sections plus a wildcard section as described below.

1. Majors will be required to answer 3 questions from at least two different sections.
2. Minors will be required to answer 2 questions from at least two different sections.
3. Questions in each section are likely to draw on knowledge of the theoretic and empirical literatures as well as well as knowledge of cases.
4. Some questions might request commentary and critique on specific readings from the list.

The structure of this exam is designed to ensure more regular and predictable coverage of the major topics covered in the survey courses. It allows students to select areas of specialization but requires minimal breadth of knowledge.

Cluster Name	# of Questions on Exam	Field Seminar
Approaches	1	Fall
Primitives	2	Fall
Political Structures	2	Spring
Outcomes I	1	Fall
Outcomes II	1	Spring
Outcomes III	1	Spring
<i>Wildcard</i>	1	-

Table 2: CP Topics Structure

## 5. Writing Good Exam Answers

A good answer to a Comps exam question:

1. **Answers the question.** It is very common to write questions that are only tangentially related to the question. Students routinely fail to answer questions of the form: “Is the effect of X on Y different in A areas and in B areas”, in some cases describing only the effects of X on Y or the differences in Y between areas, or the differences in X. Very often time is lost discussing what X is and whether it is a useful concept. There are no points for those kinds of answers. Engage in conceptual clarification only to the extent that it is asked in the question and to the extent that it is necessary to make sense of your answer. If essential you can have a short paragraph early on that stipulates and/or justifies what definitions you will use.
2. **Is structured.** Don't start writing immediately. Sit back and think about the question. Jot down the three or four major points you want to make. Think about how they relate to each other and whether they can be ordered or developed in an integrated way. Note the key research you want to engage with for each point. Anticipate how others would critique your arguments and provide counter critiques. Only then start writing.
3. **Has signposting.** At the beginning say what you are going to say. Make your main points upfront and provide a structure. Put short headers in bold over various sections so that people can see quickly where the action is.
4. **Shows awareness of the big picture but goes deeper.** The hardest thing about Comps essays is that large questions are covered but space is very constrained. Should you give short overviews of a dozen approaches or should you go deeply in to one or two. The first approach risks looking shallow, the second narrow. An effective approach is to lead sections with a rapid overview, gathering contributions together analytically and then going into more depth in a small number, justified by your overview. (Of the form: “One set of authors focuses on domestic factors (a,b,c,d), others focus on the role of international pressures (e,f,g,h); more recently authors have argued that these factors interact and you cannot understand the effects of one without understanding the other (i,j,k). Since the arguments of this third group are more general than the first two I focus my discussion on two studies in this third set.”)
5. **Is not about you.** You should have a voice but this is not about you. Graders will want to see you engaging critically with the work, they want to hear your views but they are interested in your arguments not your opinions. Avoid hyperbole. Whether you find something exciting, fantastic, or boring is not relevant; whether something is seminal or groundbreaking is relevant, but you need to say why it is seminal or groundbreaking. Avoid unnecessary adjectives and avoid all adjectives that you cannot substantively defend.
6. **Says something new.** Comps essays don't have to say something new, but it is nice when they do. Closing off with some speculations or hypotheses based on the preceding discussion, or a proposal for an approach to better address some problem, can be a satisfying way to end a comps essay. You have more rope to take a risk here if the preceding discussion on the existing literature is solid.

## 6. Sample Exam (Largely Drawn From Jan 2014 Exam)

Majors: Please answer three questions from at least two different sections. Minors: Please answer two questions from two different sections.

In each essay, you should:

- Answer the question that is asked. Refine if necessary but do not expand.
- Discuss at least two theoretical accounts and at least two bodies of evidence as they relate to the theories (a body of evidence is a study or related set of studies that address a problem empirically).
- Include critical assessments of the theoretical and empirical literatures that you discuss.

### Section I: Approaches

1. Some argue that while case studies may be useful for generating theoretical insights, quantitative analysis is needed to test theories. Provide arguments in favor or against the proposition with illustrations from research in comparative politics.

### Section II: Primitives

2. Are models of collective action useful for understanding participation in contentious politics (choose a class of political events e.g. violence, protests, strikes or other)? Discuss in the light of at least two theories and empirical evidence.
3. Describe and critique at least two theories or empirical accounts for why social conflict is sometimes organized along identity (e.g. race, class, gender) lines.

### Section III: Political Structures

4. Why do electoral rules vary across countries? What arguments have authors put forward to account for this variation and which do you find most convincing? Please discuss with reference to at least two countries.
5. In different parts of the world we have seen dramatic shifts in voting patterns and party systems. Why? In your answer, draw on appropriate theory and compare two cases.

### Section IV: Outcomes I

6. Do the same factors that explain participation in violence by individuals also explain onset of violence in polities?

### Section V: Outcomes II

7. Why do authoritarian regimes survive in some places but not others? Discuss with reference to at least two theories and two cases or empirical analyses.

### Section VI: Outcomes III

8. Under what conditions are elections most likely to result in the representation of citizens preferences? In your answer describe the logic and evidence for at least two factors that matter.

### Section VII: Wildcard

9. Why did *Syriza* call a referendum in the middle of the bailout negotiations? *Remember to use theory and evidence from the study of Comparative Politics.*

END

## 7. 2015-16 Comps Reading List

### 1. Approaches

#### 1.1. Causal Inference and Identification [Fall:15]

1. ♠ Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. W W Norton & Company Incorporated, 2012. ISBN 9780393979954. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=yxEGywAACAAJ> Chapter 2.
  2. James Mahoney. Strategies of causal inference in small-n analysis. *Sociological Methods & Research*, 28(4):387–424, 2000. URL <http://smr.sagepub.com/content/28/4/387.abstract>
  3. ♠ Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, May 1994. ISBN 0691034710. Chapter 3.
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#### 1.2. Natural Experiments [Spring:16]

1. Thad Dunning. Improving causal inference: Strengths and limitations of natural experiments. *Political Research Quarterly*, 2007. URL <http://prq.sagepub.com/content/early/2007/10/03/1065912907306470.short>
2. Daron Acemoglu, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. The consequences of radical reform: The french revolution. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009
3. Thad Dunning. Natural and field experiments: The role of qualitative methods. *Qualitative Methods*, 6(2), 2009
4. Edward Miguel. Tribe or nation? nation building and public goods in kenya versus tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(03):328–362, 2004
5. Saumitra Jha. Trade, institutions, and ethnic tolerance: Evidence from south asia. *American political Science review*, 107(04):806–832, 2013

#### 1.3. Qualitative Methods, Case Studies and Process-Tracing [Fall:15]

1. Macartan Humphreys and Alan Jacobs. Mixing Methods: A Bayesian Approach. *Working Paper*, 2015. URL <http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/BIQQ.pdf>
  2. Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman. Qualitative research: Recent developments in case study methods. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 9:455–476, 2006. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.8.082103.104918>
  3. Scott E Page. Path dependence. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 1(1):87–115, 2006. URL <http://faculty.washington.edu/jwilker/571/571readings/Page.pdf>
  4. James Mahoney and Gary Goertz. A tale of two cultures: Contrasting quantitative and qualitative research. *Political Analysis*, 14(3):227–249, 2006. URL <http://pan.oxfordjournals.org/content/14/3/227.short>
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- Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton University Press, New Jersey, May 1994. ISBN 0691034710: Chapter 1
- Barbara Geddes. How the cases you choose affect the answers you get: Selection bias in comparative politics. *Political Analysis*, 2(1):131–150, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23317768>
- Evan S. Lieberman. Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research. *American Political Science Review*, 99(03):435–452, 2005. doi: 10.1017/s0003055405051762. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30038950>
- Herbert Kitschelt. Accounting for post-communist regime diversity. *What Counts as a Good Cause*, pages 49–88, 2003. URL [http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/codwyer/z\\_External\\_Folder/Courses/Kitschelt\\_Postcommunist\\_regime\\_diversity.pdf](http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/codwyer/z_External_Folder/Courses/Kitschelt_Postcommunist_regime_diversity.pdf)

## 1.4. Models of Politics [Fall:15]

1. John C Harsanyi. Advances in understanding rational behavior. *Foundational Problems in the Special Sciences*, 1:315, 1977 (also reprinted in ♠ Jon Elster, *Rational Choice*)
2. Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions. *The Journal of Business*, 59(4), 1986. ISSN 00219398. doi: 10.2307/2352759. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2352759>
3. Kevin A Clarke and David M Primo. Modernizing political science: A model-based approach. *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(04):741–753, 2007. URL <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1429532&fileId=S1537592707072192>
4. Kathleen Thelen. Historical institutionalism in comparative politics. *Annual review of political science*, 2(1):369–404, 1999. URL <http://www.annualreviews.org/doi/abs/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.369>

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- Kenneth J. Arrow. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2):1–9, 1994. ISSN 00028282. doi: 10.2307/2117792. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117792>
  - Ann Swidler. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51(2):273–286, 1986. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521>
  - Daniel Diermeier and Keith Krehbiel. Institutionalism as a methodology. *Journal of theoretical politics*, 15(2):123–144, 2003. URL <http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/15/2/123.full.pdf+html>

## 2. Primitives

### 2.1. Collective Action & Applications [Fall:15]

1. ♠ Ken A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek. *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions*. W. W. Norton, 1 edition, December 1996. ISBN 0393971074. URL <http://www.worldcat.org/isbn/0393971074>, Chapters 8 and 9.

2. David A. Siegel. Social networks and collective action. *American Journal of Political Science*, 53(1): 122–138, 2009. ISSN 1540-5907. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00361.x>
3. Timur Kuran. Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989. *World Politics*, 44(1):7–48, 1991. ISSN 00438871. doi: 10.2307/2010422. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2010422>
4. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2945838. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2945838>

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- Mancur Olson. *The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups*. Harvard Economic Studies. Harvard University Press, 1965. ISBN 9780674041660. URL <http://books.google.com/books?id=jv8wTarzmsQC> Chapters 1 and 2
  - Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. Toward an integrated perspective on social movements and revolutions. *Comparative politics: Rationality, culture, and structure*, page 142, 1997
  - Mark Granovetter. Threshold Models of Collective Behavior. *American Journal of Sociology*, 83(6):1420–1443, 1978. ISSN 00029602. doi: 10.2307/2778111. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778111>
  - Peter A. Hall and David. Soskice. *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. Oxford University Press, 2003. ISBN 9780191647703
  - Kenneth J. Arrow. Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. *The American Economic Review*, 84(2):1–9, 1994. ISSN 00028282. doi: 10.2307/2117792. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117792>
  - James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
  - Ted R Gurr. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press, 1970. URL <http://www.worldcat.org/title/why-men-rebel/oclc/55562>

## 2.2. Bargaining & Applications [Fall:15]

1. Ronald Harry Coase. The problem of social cost. *Journal of Law and Economics*, 3:1, 1960. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/724810>
2. James D Fearon. Rationalist explanations for war. *International organization*, 49:379–379, 1995. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706903>
3. Lars Calmfors, John Driffill, Seppo Honkapohja, and Francesco Giavazzi. Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance. *Economic Policy*, pages 14–61, 1988. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344503>
4. Andrew Kydd and Barbara F Walter. Sabotaging the peace: The politics of extremist violence. *International Organization*, 56(02):263–296, 2002. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081802320005487>

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- Torben Iversen. Power, Flexibility, and the Breakdown of Centralized Wage Bargaining: Denmark and Sweden in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 28(4):399–436, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/422051>
  - Isabela Mares. *Taxation, wage bargaining, and unemployment*. Cambridge University Press, 2006
  - David Austen-Smith and Timothy J. Feddersen. Deliberation, preference uncertainty, and voting rules. *American Political Science Review*, null:209–217, 5 2006. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: 10.1017/S0003055406062113. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27644345>

### 2.3. Groups & Coalitions [Fall:15]

1. William H. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2):432–446, 1980. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/1960638. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960638>
2. Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Coalitions and Cabinet Government. *American Political Science Review*, 84(3):873–890, 1990. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1962770>
3. Michael J Hiscox. Class versus industry cleavages: inter-industry factor mobility and the politics of trade. *International Organization*, 55(01):1–46, 2001. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/002081801551405>
4. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier. Inducements versus constraints: Disaggregating “corporatism”. *The American Political Science Review*, pages 967–986, 1979. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1953982>

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- Lars Calmfors, John Driffill, Seppo Honkapohja, and Francesco Giavazzi. Bargaining structure, corporatism and macroeconomic performance. *Economic Policy*, pages 14–61, 1988. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1344503>

### 2.4. Identity Politics [Fall:15]

1. Rogers Brubaker. Ethnicity without groups. *Archives Europeennes de Sociologie*, 43(2):163–189, 2002. URL <http://search.proquest.com/docview/60454710?accountid=10226>
  2. Moses Shayo. A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution. *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):147–174, 2009. doi: 10.1017/s0003055409090194. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/27798495>
  3. Evan Lieberman. Ethnic politics, risk, and policy-making: A cross-national statistical analysis of government responses to hiv/aids. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(12):1407–1432, December 2007. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/40/12/1407.short>
  4. Kimuli Kasara. Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of agriculture in africa. *American Political Science Review*, 101(01):159–172, 2007. URL <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=695712&fileId=S0003055407070050>
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- John D Huber. Measuring ethnic voting: Do proportional electoral laws politicize ethnicity? *American Journal of Political Science*, 56(4):986–1001, 2012a
- Kanchan Chandra. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India*. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge University Press, 2007. ISBN 9780521891417. URL <http://tinyurl.com/kchandra-intro>: **Introduction**.
- Raghavendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443, 2004. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>
- James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Explaining Interethnic Cooperation. *The American Political Science Review*, 90(4):715–735, 1996. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/2945838. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2945838>
- Alberto Alesina, Reza Baqir, and William Easterly. Public goods and ethnic divisions. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1997a. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w6009>
- James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War. *The American Political Science Review*, 97(1):75–90, 2003. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/3118222. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>
- Edward Miguel. Tribe or nation? nation building and public goods in kenya versus tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(03):328–362, 2004
- Robert H. Bates. Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 6(4):457–484, 1974. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/6/4/457.full.pdf+html>
- Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York, 1983
- Keith Darden and Anna Grzymala-Busse. The great divide: literacy, nationalism, and the communist collapse. *World Politics*, 59(01):83–115, 2006. URL <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=7693668&fileId=S0043887100020736>
- Gellner Ernest. Thought and change. *London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson*, 1964

## 2.5. Political Culture [Fall:15]

1. Lisa Wedeen. Conceptualizing culture: Possibilities for political science. *American Political Science Review*, 96(04):713–728, 2002. URL <http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=133946&fileId=S0003055402000400>
2. H. Peyton Young. The economics of convention. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(2):105–122, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138484>
3. Alberto F Alesina, Paola Giuliano, and Nathan Nunn. On the origins of gender roles: Women and the plough. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2011
4. Nico Voigtländer and Hans-Joachim Voth. Persecution perpetuated: the medieval origins of anti-semitic violence in nazi germany. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 127(3):1339–1392, 2012

- Ronald Inglehart. The renaissance of political culture. *American Political Science Review*, 82(04): 1203–1230, 1988. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1961756>
- Ann Swidler. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*, 51(2):273–286, 1986. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2095521>
- Sidney Verba and Gabriel Almond. *The civic culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy*. Sage, 1963
- Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York, 1983
- Robert W Jackman and Ross A Miller. A renaissance of political culture? *American Journal of Political Science*, pages 632–659, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2111787>

## 2.6. Institutions [Fall:15]

1. Kenneth A Shepsle. Rational choice institutionalism. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, pages 23–38, 2006.
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! 2015 Note: Previous section on Bureaucracies [2014-15] now folded into “The State”

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#### 6.4. Policy Choice & Policy Reform [Spring:16]

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# Appendices: Syllabuses & Full Bibliography

# A. Fall 2015 Comparative Politics Field Seminar Syllabus

**Instructor:** Macartan Humphreys | mh2245@columbia.edu

**Location etc.:** Monday 10:10pm-12:00pm 711 International Affairs Building.

## A.1. Overview

This is the first of the two sequence comparative politics field seminar. The seminar is targeted at first and second year PhD students in the department of political science. This first part focuses on the (often micro) building blocks of comparative political analysis and begins to touch on the (largely) macro political outcomes. The course has two objectives. One is to expose you to leading work in the field. We focus on research that is innovative and strong. The second is to train you to think like a comparativist, honing your skills in analytical reading and critique. The second course in the sequence (taught by Isabela Mares) takes this material as given and focuses on political structures as well as further topics including topics focused on developed countries.

## A.2. Material

The topics for each week are described in Table 3. The textbfnumbered items on the 2015-16 Comps Reading List are required for class. The **bulleted** items on each section are examinable for the topics in question but you are not expected to have read these for class. In Table 3 I also point to small numbers of additional readings that might support discussion, but which are not part of the Comps reading list. These include some segments from the manuscript formally known as *Hell is Other People (HOP)*, which can be found on courseworks

## A.3. Requirements

**Admission.** To do now: Fill up this form before midnight Tues 15 September; you will not be admitted if you do not complete this form by midnight Tuesday 15 September: <http://tinyurl.com/CP2014SS>. Note that the target size for the class is 16 and there will be a hard cap of 18. Priority is given to PhD students in political science that need to take comprehensive exams in CP.

### A.3.1. Reading and arguing [25%]

The Syllabus lists both required reading and further reading. You will be expected to have completed all the required readings before class *to the point where you can be called on to critique or defend any reading at any time*. You should contribute actively and be engaged in the discussion at *all* times. If the discussion does not make sense to you then stop the class and say so — it probably doesn't make sense to others either. Any computer use should be for note taking only and quick checking of facts directly related to class discussion; emailing, SMSing etc are strictly not allowed and you will be asked to withdraw if you wander like that.

### A.3.2. Writing [75%]

You will write three papers that engage with readings or topics of the course. Each paper will be no more than 3000 words in length and count for 25% of your final grade. Topics will be provided in advance. These topics will be similar in nature to the sort of topics that you will see on comps exams. You should be prepared to move well beyond the readings of the class to address them. Each paper will be followed by a discussion (see schedule in Table 4) with the instructor in which you will be asked to defend or expand on ideas provided in your written answers.

Table 3: 2014 Fall Schedule

<b>Approaches</b>		
14 Sept	1.1 Causal Inference and Identification <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	Since this is the first class it will be more lecture style. Catch up on the readings afterwards however since these ideas will be used throughout the course. See notes on courseworks as well as <a href="http://egap.org/methods-guides/10-things-you-need-know-about-causal-inference">http://egap.org/methods-guides/10-things-you-need-know-about-causal-inference</a> and <a href="http://egap.org/methods-guides/10-strategies-figuring-out-if-x-caused-y">http://egap.org/methods-guides/10-strategies-figuring-out-if-x-caused-y</a> .
21 Sept	1.3 Qualitative Methods, Case Studies and Process-Tracing <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	A key idea here is that satisfactory causal accounts have to have both a <i>measurement</i> strategy and an <i>identification</i> strategy. We will focus especially on the identification strategy used in qualitative work and think through the implications of identification strategy for case selection.
28 Sept	1.4 Models of Politics <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	We will discuss multiple approaches including game theoretic approaches and alternatives. We will go over key ideas from formal theory in class; for this the Harsanyi piece is a good primer, but any other introductory text can also be used. You may find the introduction to <b>HOP</b> useful. Discussions will focus on what constitutes a theory and how theoretical work relates to empirical inquiry. Please also read: John Huber <a href="http://tinyurl.com/CPHUBER-MC">http://tinyurl.com/CPHUBER-MC</a>
<b>Primitives</b>		
05 Oct	2.1 Collective Action & Applications <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	Also read items 1,2,3,4, 38 of <b>HOP</b> .
12 Oct	2.2 Bargaining & Applications <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	The bargaining framework can be used to understand a wide range of issues, particular ones in which outcomes are in some sense inefficient. Focus on clarifying what the moving parts are of a bargaining based explanation— what determines variation in bargaining outcomes. Also read items 27-30 of <b>HOP</b> .
19 Oct	2.3 Groups & Coalitions <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	A key question in coalitional analysis is figuring out why we don't always see grand coalitions — why do humans divide themselves into groups? Is the existence of groups an instance of bargaining failure? Though not required reading you might find <a href="http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/arps_coalitions.pdf">http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/arps_coalitions.pdf</a> a useful review of this very wide field. It is dense though. See also: <b>HOP</b> 9, 13-15.
26 Oct	2.4 Identity Politics <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	People are often divided into various types of identity based groups. Are these special cases of coalitions or is there something distinctive about them?
02 Nov	<b>NO CLASS</b>	
09 Nov	2.5 Political Culture <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	It will be particularly useful to try to relate the ideas from this weeks readings to what we read in week 1.4: are cultural accounts consistent with methodological individualism or not?
16 Nov	2.6 Institutions <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	Do institutions matter? Or are outcomes driven by something more fundamental like the distribution of power and the structure of preferences? Also review Riker (1980) from section 2.3 and Young (1996) from section 2.5. See <b>HOP</b> 17.
<b>Outcomes I</b>		
23 Nov	4.1 Political Violence <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	Violence is sometimes seen as an instance of bargaining failure. Is that a useful way to view it? In what ways is violent action fundamentally different from other types of political action? Review also Kydd and Walter (2002) See <b>HOP</b> 41.
30 Nov	4.2 Non-Electoral Participation <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	We will focus especially on participation in violent collective action. Do the logics we explore also shed light on nonviolent collective action? Do explanations that account for participation in movements also explain the existence or success of those movements? See <b>HOP</b> 39-40
07 Dec	4.3 Revolutions and Regime Change [Structures] <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	Review Kuran (1991) from week 2.1. Is there a difference between a revolution and any other type of political transition? What are the revolutions that have not happened, and why haven't they?
14 Dec	4.4 Democratization <a href="#">[Fall:15]</a>	What accounts for the rise and fall of democracies. Why does democratization seem to happen in waves? Do democracies get “caused” by wealth or are they just more likely to stick around in wealthy places? For a criticism of Limongi and Przeworski (1997) see Epstein et al. (2006).

Table 4: Short paper schedule

Questions provided	Due	Feedback day	Signup link
28-Sept	05-Oct	Tu 13-Oct	<a href="http://doodle.com/poll/8q24zyqs6y7b7uci">http://doodle.com/poll/8q24zyqs6y7b7uci</a>
16-Nov	23-Nov	Th 26-Nov	<a href="http://doodle.com/poll/zhip2k2a5h9ix3pv">http://doodle.com/poll/zhip2k2a5h9ix3pv</a>
30-Nov	07-Dec	Tu 15-Dec	<a href="http://doodle.com/poll/mrcywcvxbm5596hu">http://doodle.com/poll/mrcywcvxbm5596hu</a>

## **B. Spring 2016 Syllabus**

Material as described in Table 2.

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