49 compelling insights from game theory, applied to politics

This very brief text uses bold graphics and stories from contemporary politics to present forty-nine of the most compelling insights from game theory. Collectively these “games” reveal profound connections between seemingly disparate social problems, from negotiating who does the dishes to protecting the global environment, and illuminate the common logics underlying a variety of political interactions.

Each “game” is presented across a two-page spread. The first page draws on a case from recent politics and explains how game theory helps us understand it. The facing page depicts the game graphically. For more information, including availability for Fall 2016 classes, contact Emily Stuart at ESTUART@WWNORTON.COM.

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